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Challenges in Restructuring Alaska’s Salmon Fisheries 
 




Over the past fifteen years, Alaska’s salmon industry has experienced dramatic losses in income, 
market share, permit and boat values, and tax revenues to communities and the state. The 
economic crisis in the salmon industry—driven by competition from farmed salmon and other 
factors—has prompted numerous task forces and summits to call for improved quality, new 
products, better marketing, and other measures to enable Alaska’s salmon industry to compete 
more effectively in world salmon markets. However, there has been relatively little discussion of 
restructuring Alaska’s salmon fisheries. 
 
Alaska’s salmon management has multiple objectives. A primary objective has been conserving 
Alaska’s salmon resources. Alaska’s success in achieving this objective is reflected in healthy 
and abundant salmon runs. 
 
Another objective of Alaska’s salmon management has been to spread the wealth of salmon 
fisheries among Alaskans.  Alaska has also succeeded in this objective, as reflected in the fact 
that thousands of Alaskans from across the state fish for salmon every year, and many 
communities in Alaska rely on and benefit from these fisheries. 
 
However, the salmon management that has succeeded in conserving resources and spreading the 
wealth has also—in some cases—resulted in higher costs of harvesting salmon or lower quality 
and value than would have been the case if salmon fisheries were managed differently. 
Regulations, which have evolved to achieve conservation and social objectives, have also had 
economic consequences—making it more difficult for Alaska’s salmon industry to compete in 
increasingly competitive world markets.  Restructuring could potentially lower costs and raise 
the quality and value of Alaska salmon harvests—allowing the salmon industry to remain 
competitive.  
 
But restructuring is difficult.  Changes in salmon management would affect fishermen and 
communities in different ways, and the industry is divided about what kinds of changes are 
needed—or whether any are needed at all. Partly because of the complexity and divisiveness of 
the issues, Alaskans have avoided serious discussion of restructuring salmon management. As 
the economic challenges facing the salmon industry have worsened, Alaska’s salmon 
management has remained essentially unchanged. 
 
The Board of Fisheries recently created the Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel to study the 
issues raised by restructuring proposals and to make recommendations to the legislature about 
how to address them. If the Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel is to succeed in engaging 
Alaskans in a meaningful discussion leading to real change, it is important for everyone to 
understand the obstacles that have thus far hampered discussions of restructuring. 
 
In this paper, we argue that public debate and action on restructuring have been limited by 
several factors: the complexity and controversial nature of restructuring, the absence of 
 i  
leadership on this issue from either the industry or government, and the ambiguity of 
responsibility and authority within state government for the economic success of Alaska’s 
fisheries.  The Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game have a clear 
mandate to conserve Alaska’s salmon and authority to enact regulations necessary to achieve that 
objective.  But that mandate and authority do not extend to the more complex and difficult 
objective of managing Alaska’s salmon resources for the “maximum benefit” of Alaskans, as the 
Alaska Constitution requires. 
 
The state legislature—which has the ultimate authority for managing Alaska’s fisheries—has 
neither defined “maximum benefit” nor established policies to achieve such maximum benefit. 
Nor has the legislature delegated clear responsibility and authority to any other agency for either 
defining maximum benefit or restructuring Alaska salmon management to strengthen the 
industry’s economic viability.  Until this responsibility and authority are clearly established, it 
will be difficult for restructuring to succeed.  
 
As long-time participants in and observers of the debate about the salmon industry, we have 
thought about these issues for many years.  Like many Alaskans, we care about the future of 
Alaska’s salmon industry and those who depend on it.  Our goal is not to advocate any specific 
changes in the management of Alaska’s salmon fisheries, but rather to advocate for a process to 
address the concerns and needs of Alaskans—and ultimately enable change—so that Alaska’s 
salmon fisheries can be not only a biological success but also an economic success. 
 
Our purpose in this paper is not to suggest that restructuring is the only way to address the 
challenges facing the salmon industry.  We recognize that restructuring is only part of a broader 
strategy, which must include effective marketing, infrastructure development, and other changes.  
Nor do we advocate any particular management changes.  We recognize that Alaska’s salmon 
fisheries vary widely and that different approaches are needed in different fisheries.  
 
The Board of Fisheries’ Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel offers a new opportunity to address 
the complex issues associated with restructuring the salmon industry. Based on our analysis of 
the inherent challenges in restructuring Alaska salmon management, the institutional constraints 
to restructuring, and previous experiences in restructuring Alaska fisheries, we have some ideas 
about how the panel could make a substantive contribution. We suggest that the panel should: 
 
• Concentrate exclusively on restructuring, because many previous forums have focused on 
other strategies for revitalizing the salmon industry but largely ignored restructuring. 
• Analyze the legal, economic, and social implications of restructuring. 
• Devise a process by which stakeholders can initiate and achieve change, including standards 
by which restructuring proposals will be evaluated, and how and by whom decisions will be 
made.  More generally, the panel should recommend how clear responsibility, authority, and 
capability can be established within state government to make the changes in fisheries 
management necessary for the economic success of Alaska’s fisheries.  Ultimately, this will 
require action by the legislature.   
• Assist the Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Legislature in a meaningful discussion of 
Alaska’s goals for its salmon fisheries—including definition of “maximum benefit”—
because the regulatory agencies and participants in Alaska salmon fisheries need clearer 
policy guidance.
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Over the past fifteen years, Alaska’s salmon industry has experienced dramatic losses in income, 
market share, permit and boat values, and tax revenues to communities and the state.  Between 
1986 and 1995, the value of Alaska’s salmon catches averaged more than $500 million.  
Between 2001 and 2004 it averaged less than $200 million.   
 
The economic crisis in the salmon industry—driven by competition from farmed salmon and 
other factors—has prompted numerous task forces and “summits” to call for improved quality, 
new products, better marketing, and other measures to enable Alaska’s salmon industry to 
compete more effectively in world salmon markets.  However, there has been relatively little 
discussion of restructuring Alaska’s salmon fisheries.   
 
Terms such as “management system”, “management,” and “restructuring” mean different 
things to different people.  Here is how we define those terms in this paper: 
 
Salmon management system:   
All the organizations that 
make decisions affecting 
salmon management, the  
laws that establish the  
general framework for  
salmon management, and  
the regulations implementing 
those laws. 












































Constitution & Laws Regulations
 
Salmon management:  The 
constitutional provisions 
relating to fisheries 
management, the laws 
establishing the general 
framework for salmon 
management (such as the 




Restructuring:  Major changes in the management of a fishery, undertaken primarily for 
economic or social reasons, rather than for conservation.  Restructuring generally is intended to 
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Alaska’s salmon management has multiple objectives.  A primary objective has been 
conservation of Alaska’s salmon resources.  Alaska’s success in achieving this objective is 
reflected in healthy and abundant salmon runs. 
 
Another objective of Alaska’s salmon management has been to spread the wealth of salmon 
fisheries among Alaskans.  Alaska has also succeeded in this objective, as reflected in the fact 
that thousands of Alaskans from across the state—permit holders and crew—fish for salmon 
every year.  The salmon industry is the major economic support for dozens of coastal 
communities. 
 
However, the salmon management system that has succeeded in conserving resources and 
spreading the wealth has also—in some cases—resulted in higher costs of harvesting salmon or 
lower quality and value.  Laws and regulations that have evolved to achieve conservation and 
social objectives have also had economic consequences, making it more difficult for Alaska’s 
salmon industry to compete in increasingly competitive world markets.  Restructuring could 
potentially lower costs and raise the quality and value of Alaska salmon harvests—allowing the 
salmon industry to remain competitive. 
 
But restructuring is difficult.  Changes in management would affect fishermen and communities 
in different ways, and the industry is divided about what kinds of changes are needed—or 
whether any change are needed at all. The issues are complex, and the stakes are high. 
 
Partly because of the complexity and divisiveness of the issues, Alaskans have avoided serious 
discussion of restructuring salmon management.  For more than a decade, as the economic 
challenges facing the salmon industry have worsened,1 Alaska’s salmon management has 
remained essentially unchanged.  The single notable exception is the Chignik salmon fishery, 
where the Board of Fisheries authorized a fishing cooperative, which we discuss later. 
 
However, serious discussion of restructuring is beginning.  Over the coming year, a Board of 
Fisheries’ Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel will study the issues raised by restructuring 
proposals and make recommendations to the legislature about how to address them.2   
 
If the Salmon Restructuring Panel is to succeed in engaging Alaskans in a meaningful discussion 
that could lead to real change, it is important to understand the obstacles hampering discussions 
of restructuring.  In this paper, we argue that three things have limited public debate and action 
on restructuring: (1) restructuring is complicated and controversial:  stakeholders are divided 
about what change is desirable because they will be affected differently; (2) there has been very 
little leadership from either the industry or government to promote restructuring; and (3) there is 
an absence of clear responsibility and authority within state government for the economic 
success of Alaska’s fisheries.  The Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Department of Fish and 
                                                 
1 The 2004 salmon season provided welcome good news in several fisheries that provide high-quality fresh and 
frozen salmon for domestic markets (such as the Copper River fishery and Southeast Alaska troll fisheries).  These 
fisheries experienced strong prices, fueled by rising demand for wild salmon following press reports questioning the 
safety of farmed salmon.  However, for many Alaska salmon fisheries dependent on other markets, prices remained 
severely depressed. 
2 Announcement of the Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel, posted May 19, 2004 on the Web site of the Alaska 
Board of Fisheries:  http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/news/callfwkgrp.pdf. 
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Game have a clear mandate to conserve Alaska’s salmon resources and authority to enact 
regulations necessary to achieve that objective.  But that mandate and authority do not extend to 
the more complex and difficult objective—required by the state constitution—of managing 
Alaska’s salmon resources for the “maximum benefit” of Alaskans.  There is no clear definition 
of “maximum benefit” nor any clear policy to guide the economic regulation of the industry. 
 
The legislature—which has ultimate authority for Alaska’s fisheries management—has avoided 
the difficult task of defining “maximum benefit” or policies to achieve it.  Nor has it delegated 
clear responsibility and authority for this task to any other agency, or the responsibility and 
authority to restructure Alaska salmon management for the purpose of strengthening the 
economic viability of the industry.  Unless and until this responsibility and authority are clearly 
established, it will be difficult for restructuring to succeed. 
 
Our purpose in this paper is not to suggest that restructuring is the only way to address the 
challenges facing the salmon industry.  We recognize that restructuring is only part of a broader 
strategy that must also include effective marketing, infrastructure development, and other 
changes.  Nor do we advocate any particular management changes.  We recognize that Alaska’s 
salmon fisheries vary widely and that different approaches are needed in different fisheries. 
 
As long-time participants in and observers of the debate about the salmon industry, we offer 
these suggestions to stimulate additional discussion of the full range of options.  Like many 
Alaskans, we have thought about these issues for many years, and we care strongly about the 
future of Alaska’s salmon industry and those who depend on it.  Our goal is not to advocate any 
specific changes in the management of Alaska’s salmon fisheries, but rather to advocate for a 
process to address the concerns and needs of Alaskans—and ultimately enable change—so 
Alaska’s salmon fisheries can be not only a biological success but also an economic success. 
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Constitutional Principles for Alaska’s Salmon Management 
 
One of the prizes of statehood was the right for Alaskans to manage their salmon fisheries.  
During territorial days, over many decades of federal management, Alaskans had experienced a 
dramatic decline in salmon runs and the economic control of the salmon fisheries by Seattle-
based processing interests.  Resentment of processor owned salmon traps—which caught a large 
share of Alaska’s salmon—was an important catalyst in the drive for Alaska statehood. 
 
Alaska’s Constitution established several fundamental principles for the management of Alaska’s 
fisheries.  Fisheries were to be managed for “sustained yield” and “for the “maximum benefit” of 
the people.  In addition, fisheries were “reserved to the people for common use,” and no 
“exclusive right or special privilege of fishery” was to be created. 
 
Key Provisions of the Alaska Constitution (Article VIII) Related to Fishery Management 
 
SECTION 2. GENERAL AUTHORITY. The legislature shall provide for the utilization, 
development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and 
waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.  
 
SECTION 4. SUSTAINED YIELD. Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other 
replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the 
sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses. 
 
SECTION 3. COMMON USE. Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 
waters are reserved to the people for common use.  
 
SECTION 15. NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF FISHERY. No exclusive right or special privilege 
of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not 
restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource 
conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for 
a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.  
 




Alaska’s Biological Success in Managing Salmon for Sustained Yield  
 
Given the health of Alaska salmon runs and very high commercial salmon catches over the past 
two decades (Figure 1), Alaska salmon resource management is considered a biological success, 
particularly in comparison with other places where salmon stocks have declined.  Alaska has 
succeeded in meeting the constitutional mandate to manage salmon fisheries for “sustained 
yield”—as reflected in the certification of Alaska’s commercial salmon fisheries program as 
“sustainable” by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in 2000, following an evaluation by an 
independent certification firm.   
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Alaskans are justifiably proud of this success.  For example, an Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game brochure, entitled “Alaska’s Salmon Management: A Story of Success,” describes how 
Alaska’s “management and policies promote the sustainability of salmon stocks that are wild, 
abundant and healthy.”3 
 
Figure 1 






































































Why has Alaska succeeded in sustained yield management of its salmon fisheries?  One 
cornerstone in this success has been in-season management focused on achieving escapement 
objectives by monitoring run strength and allowing commercial harvests only when progress 
towards escapement goals is satisfactory.  Another cornerstone has been the protection of habitat 
and water quality. 
 
A more fundamental reason, however, has been an institutional commitment to sustained yield 
management.  The Alaska Legislature, which has fundamental authority for Alaska fisheries 
management, has clearly delegated authority to the Board of Fisheries to establish regulations 
                                                 
3 The state’s fishery management is not the only factor contributing to strong harvests over the past two decades.  
Other factors include the state’s salmon enhancement program—in particular, hatchery releases of pink and chum 
salmon—and favorable ocean conditions (Milo D. Adkison and Bruce P. Finney, “The Long-Term Outlook for 
Salmon Returns to Alaska,” Alaska Fishery Research Bulletin, Vol. 10 No. 2, Winter 2003). 
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“for the purposes of conservation and development” of Alaska’s fisheries resources4 and to the 
Department of Fish and Game to “manage, protect, maintain, improve, and extend” Alaska’s fish 
resources.5 
 
In government, the salmon industry, and among the public, there is a clear understanding of the 
priority of conservation goals over other goals such as allocation.  There is a clear separation of 
conservation goals from other goals in the regulatory process.6  The Department of Fish and 
Game has employed biologists who have done research as a basis for regulatory decisions 
affecting conservation.  The legislature has provided adequate funding for the Board and the 
Department to make the necessary decisions to meet conservation objectives (although in recent 
years these budgets have been significantly reduced). 
 
Put simply, Alaska has achieved biological goals for its salmon management because these goals 
are clearly understood, the responsibility and authority for achieving these goals is clear, and 
there is adequate funding for the research and management needed to achieve these goals.  
 
 
The Tension Between Social and Economic Objectives in Alaska Salmon Management 
While Alaska’s objective of managing salmon fisheries for sustained yield is clear, other 
objectives are less clear.  The state constitution establishes that fisheries shall be managed for the 
“maximum benefit” of the people.  However, the meaning of “maximum benefit” is subject to a 
wide range of interpretations.  Thus it is not surprising that fisheries management has always 
been one of the most contentious topics of Alaska politics.  
 
Inherent in the challenge of managing fisheries for “maximum benefit” has been a long-standing 
tension between social and economic objectives.  Since statehood, an implicit “social” objective 
of Alaska’s salmon management system has been to spread the benefits of our salmon fisheries 
widely among Alaskans.  This objective is specifically reflected in the constitutional provisions 
that the fisheries are “reserved to the people for common use” and banning the establishment of 
any “exclusive right or special privilege of fishery.”   
 
An implicit economic objective of salmon management is to keep costs low—at least low 
enough so that fishing is profitable.  Commercial fishing is an economic activity that cannot 
continue at all—or provide any social benefits—unless the costs of catching the fish are less than 
the value of the fish. 
 
The tension between social and economic objectives arises from the fact that many regulations 
which help to spread the benefits of the fishery also directly or indirectly add to costs of fishing 
or lower the value of the fish, compared with other potential ways of managing the fishery. 
                                                 
4 AS 16.05.221 
5 AS 16.01.10 
6 A 1987 study by the legislature’s Senate Advisory Council noted that “In Alaska there is a de facto separation of 
the conservation and allocation decision processes. The Board of Fisheries almost invariably accepts the 
recommendations of the department, its technical advisor, on conservation matters, while concentrating its attention 
on allocation issues.” (Sheila Helgath and Richard Rainery, The Alaska Board of Fisheries:  Fishery Management 
Alternatives, Senate Advisory Council, October 1987, page 11. 
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For example, in many Alaska salmon fisheries, the number of limited entry permits—and boats 
fishing—is significantly greater than the number of boats that would be needed to catch the 
available fish.  As a result, total costs are higher and the profitability of individual fishing 
operations is lower than if there were fewer permits and boats. 
 
A wide variety of fishery regulations were adopted with the specific goal of reducing the 
efficiency of fishing, such as restrictions on the amount of gear that can be fished from a single 
boat or set-net site, and restrictions on the use of boats in more than one salmon fishery per year. 
 
In some Alaska fisheries, fish could be caught more efficiently using other types of gear.  For 
example, in high-volume fisheries such as Bristol Bay, fish could be caught at lower cost using 
seine gear.  However, seiners would employ far fewer fishermen and would make it very 
difficult for small gillnet boats to compete.   
 
Perhaps the most prominent example of a regulation adopted to reduce efficiency is Alaska’s ban 
on fish traps—one of the first pieces of legislation adopted by the Alaska Legislature after 
statehood.  Traps can be a very efficient way of catching salmon—and have the added potential 
advantage of catching fish live, allowing for very high quality.  But traps employ far fewer 
fishermen and concentrate the value of the catch in the hands of the few trap owners—as 
occurred in territorial days, when resentment against Outside-owned traps was a major issue in 
Alaska’s drive for statehood. 
 
One feature of Alaska’s salmon management system is a “race for fish.”  When fishing capacity 
significantly exceeds the number of fish available to be caught in a given period, fishermen need 
to work as fast as possible to compete successfully for the available fish—allowing less time for 
careful handling.  This, together with restrictions on boat size and gear, adds to costs and 
contributes to widely recognized quality problems in some fisheries, lowering the reputation and 
value of Alaska salmon in world markets. 




Two thirty-two foot Bristol Bay 
gillnetters. Although regulations 
limit boat length, over time more 
and more fishermen have built 
wider and taller boats in an 
effort to catch a larger share of 
the available fish.  Boat costs 
have increased without any 
corresponding increase in 

















Fishing the Egegik North Line in Bristol Bay.  
Clearly, the available fish could be caught by 
fewer boats at lower cost.  Intense competition 
also results in gear damage and makes it 
difficult to handle fish carefully.  (Photograph 
by Bart Eaton.) 
 
 





Bristol Bay fishermen picking fish fr
a drift gillnet.  It is difficult to handle
fish carefully in the crowded space on
board small boats while working to
catch fish as fast as possible.  
















Fish delivered to a processor from a beach set net 
operation.  It is difficult to maintain high quality for 












processing plant.  In contrast to most 
Alaska wild salmon, farmed salmon 
are tendered live from the farm site to
the holding pen and are kept alive until
immediately before processing—
allowing for very high quality. 
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The Economic Crisis in the Alaska Salmon Industry 
 
The 1980s were prosperous economic times in the Alaska salmon fishery.  Salmon runs 
rebounded and prices rose—driven by a booming Japanese economy and the rising value of the 
Japanese yen.  The value of Alaska salmon harvests increased from average of about $200 
million during most of the 1960s and 1970s to more than $500 million throughout the 1980s, 
with a peak value of more than $1 billion in 1988 (Figure 2). 
 
The salmon fisheries were not only an economic success.  Alaska was also succeeding in the 
social objective of spreading the wealth of the salmon fisheries widely among Alaskans.  Tens of 
thousands of Alaskans from across the state—permit holders and crew—were employed in 
salmon fishing.  Coastal communities prospered, and limited entry permit holders’ wealth grew 
as permits increased in value.  Not surprisingly, little thought was given to the ways in which 
salmon management regulations affected costs or quality. 
 
Over the past fifteen years, the economic condition of the salmon industry has been drastically 
reversed.  Alaska’s salmon industry has experienced dramatic losses in income, market share, 
permit and boat values, and tax revenues to communities and the state. Between 2001 and 2004, 
the average real (inflation-adjusted) value of Alaska salmon catches was less than one-third the 
average for the years 1978 to 1995. 
 
Figure 2 
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The causes of the decline in prices and value in Alaska’s commercial salmon industry are 
complex, and they vary from fishery to fishery.  The biggest factor has been competition from 
farmed salmon—but other factors such as lower sockeye salmon catches and a stagnant Japanese 
economy have also contributed.7   
 
Table 1 
Changes in Alaska Salmon Fisheries, 1986-90 to 2000-02:  Total Earnings and Average Earnings
millions of dollars % dollars %
 Southeast  Purse Seine -19.3 -36% -$42,367 -30%
 Bristol Bay  Drift Gillnet -113.1 -73% -$57,756 -69%
 Prince William Sd.  Drift Gillnet -5.0 -20% -$10,284 -21%
 Kodiak  Purse Seine -28.4 -66% -$56,294 -42%
 Statewide  Power Troll -10.0 -42% -$8,801 -31%
 Prince William Sd.  Purse Seine -17.4 -59% -$25,502 -22%
 Southeast  Drift Gillnet -10.0 -49% -$18,874 -43%
 Bristol Bay  Set Gillnet -15.0 -60% -$14,919 -55%
 Chignik  Purse Seine -13.6 -61% -$108,869 -50%
 Kodiak  Set Gillnet -8.5 -65% -$58,392 -66%
 Cook Inlet  Set Gillnet -32.3 -87% -$47,097 -83%
 Cook Inlet  Drift Gillnet -45.0 -91% -$74,708 -88%
 Ak Peninsula  Drift Gillnet -14.2 -67% -$81,072 -63%
 Ak Pen./Aleut. Is.  Purse Seine -20.0 -85% -$145,051 -72%
 Ak Peninsula  Set Gillnet -4.9 -62% -$44,086 -60%
 Prince William Sd.  Set Gillnet 0.4 49% $12,830 40%
 Yakutat  Set Gillnet -3.7 -77% -$20,460 -67%
 Statewide  Hand Troll -3.1 -79% -$2,434 -46%
 Kuskokwim  Set Gillnet -6.6 -89% -$7,638 -84%
 Cook Inlet  Purse Seine -2.6 -76% -$21,692 -43%
 Kotzebue  Set Gillnet -0.8 -74% -$1,713 -28%
 Norton Sound  Set Gillnet -0.5 -86% -$2,485 -68%
 Kodiak  Beach Seine 0.0 0% $0 0%
 Upper Yukon  Fish Wheel -0.9 -99% -$7,113 -94%
 Lower Yukon  Set Gillnet -6.9 -90% -$10,036 -88%
 Upper Yukon  Set Gillnet -0.2 -98% -$4,779 -95%
 Total, All Fisheries -381.6 -66%
Area Gear
Change in average annual earnings per 
permit fishedChange in average annual total earnings
Source:  Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Basic Information Tables for Alaska salmon fisheries.  Note:  1986-90 
average from which the changes were calculated excludes 1989 (the year of the Exxon Valdez oil spill) for the following 
fisheries:  Kodiak purse seine, Cook Inlet drift gillnet, Prince William Sound set gillnet, and Kodiak Beach Seine.  
 
The decline in the value of Alaska’s salmon fisheries has had wide-ranging economic and social 
effects on Alaska’s salmon fishermen and fishing communities.  Processing plants have closed, 
leaving fishermen without markets. Fishermen have had trouble meeting loan payments, and 
some have lost their permits and boats.  As permit and boat values have declined, many 
                                                 
7 For recent discussions of the causes and effects of the decline in economic value of the salmon industry, see Neal 
Gilbertsen, “The Global Salmon Industry and Its Impacts in Alaska,” Alaska Economic Trends, October 2003, and 
Gunnar Knapp, Challenges and Strategies for the Alaska Salmon Industry, University of Alaska Anchorage, 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, 2001. 
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fishermen have lost much of the value of their assets.  Communities have cut back on services as 
tax revenues have declined.  Many permit holders have stopped fishing their permits, and young 
people and fishing families have left fishing communities in search of other opportunities.  All of 
these economic stresses have contributed to social stress. 
 
Table 2 
dollars % millions of dollars %
 Southeast  Purse Seine -$34,244 -51% -14.3 -52%
 Bristol Bay  Drift Gillnet -$133,630 -75% -231.4 -73%
 Prince William Sd.  Drift Gillnet -$47,553 -47% -25.5 -47%
 Kodiak  Purse Seine -$71,201 -82% -27.2 -82%
 Statewide  Power Troll -$15,631 -53% -14.4 -52%
 Prince William Sd.  Purse Seine -$148,462 -88% -39.0 -87%
 Southeast  Drift Gillnet -$48,587 -59% -22.6 -58%
 Bristol Bay  Set Gillnet -$25,024 -52% -23.8 -50%
 Chignik  Purse Seine -$175,200 -48% -14.9 -46%
 Kodiak  Set Gillnet $9,516 12% 1.8 12%
 Cook Inlet  Set Gillnet -$39,497 -79% -29.3 -79%
 Cook Inlet  Drift Gillnet -$111,807 -83% -62.5 -83%
 Ak Peninsula  Drift Gillnet -$171,412 -64% -26.8 -63%
 Ak Pen./Aleut. Is.  Purse Seine -$161,650 -78% -19.2 -78%
 Ak Peninsula  Set Gillnet -$6,024 -7% -0.7 -7%
 Prince William Sd.  Set Gillnet $2,427 4% 0.2 15%
 Yakutat  Set Gillnet -$4,923 -16% -0.7 -15%
 Statewide  Hand Troll -$2,539 -39% -7.0 -58%
 Kuskokwim  Set Gillnet -$4,010 -37% -3.4 -38%
 Cook Inlet  Purse Seine -$78,276 -84% -6.4 -84%
 Kotzebue  Set Gillnet -$6,878 -77% -1.6 -81%
 Norton Sound  Set Gillnet -$5,733 -56% -1.2 -59%
 Kodiak  Beach Seine -$17,182 -51% -0.3 -37%
 Upper Yukon  Fish Wheel -$3,691 -33% -0.3 -21%
 Lower Yukon  Set Gillnet -$11,414 -49% -8.1 -49%
 Upper Yukon  Set Gillnet -$1,838 -20% -0.1 -17%
 Total, All Fisheries -578.7 -66%
Changes in Alaska Salmon Fisheries, 1986-90 to 2000-02:  Permit Prices and Permit Wealth
Change in permit price Change in permit wealth
Source:  Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Basic Information Tables for Alaska salmon fisheries.  




As the profitability of the Alaska salmon fishery has declined, the effects of regulations on cost 
and value of have become increasingly important.  They are important not just because they 
affect the profitability of the fisheries, but also because they affect Alaska’s ability to achieve 
social objectives of the fisheries.  An industry which is not profitable cannot provide wealth to be 
spread among Alaskans. 
 
Alaska’s Salmon Strategy Debate 
Since salmon prices began to decline in the early 1990s, fishermen, processors, policy makers, 
community leaders, and consultants have debated how to address the challenges facing Alaska’s 
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salmon industry.  A series of task forces, forums, and summits have recommended a wide variety 
of strategies for revitalizing Alaska’s salmon industry.8  
 
Alaska’s Salmon Strategy Debate, 1991-2004:  Selected Reports, Task Forces and Forums 
Salmon Strategy 
Task Force (1991) 
A 13-member Task Force appointed by Governor Wally Hickel, including three legislators, 
two commissioners, three processors, the executive director of the United Fishermen of 
Alaska, and others.  The task force met four times during the fall of 1991, invited written 
and oral comments, and wrote a 10-page report that included “Recommendations for 





A three-day meeting held in Juneau in January 1997.  About 120 people attended, including 
the governor and lieutenant governor, commissioners, state employees, representatives of 
fishermen’s organizations, processors, hatcheries, municipalities, and others.  A 
proceedings report, prepared by a consultant, included “strategies for action” that 
“represented the general consensus of breakout groups.” 
Salmon Forum II 
(1998) 
A two-day meeting held in Anchorage in February 1998, sponsored by Governor Tony 
Knowles’ Salmon Cabinet.  Over 200 people attended, including harvesters representing 
every gear type and region, large and small processors, and state agency officials. The 
forum featured presentations by industry experts and extensive discussion focused on 
quality, cost efficiency, and industry relations. Based on discussions at the forum, a 
“Sounding Board” working group prepared a Forum Issue Summary and Action Plan. 
Many of the recommendations addressed quality, cost efficiency, and industry relations. 
Alaska Salmon 
Forum (1999) 
A two-day meeting held in Anchorage in March 1999, sponsored by Governor Tony 
Knowles’ Salmon Cabinet, and attended by numerous state and community representatives 
as well as fishermen and processors.  On the first day invited speakers discussed the state 
of the industry, challenges facing the industry, and potential strategies for the industry.  On 
the second day work groups discussed issues and developed recommendations, which were 
summarized in a 58-page report.  
Alaska Fish Summit 
(2002) 
A one-day meeting held in Kodiak in April 2004, co-hosted by Governor Tony Knowles 
and U.S. Senator Ted Stevens and attended by many Alaska legislators and state and 
community officials, as well as numerous representatives of fishing and fish processing 
companies.  The summit endorsed the creation of a Joint Legislative Salmon Industry Task 
Force to “work on what the state, the federal government and industry can do to deal with 
current salmon fishing issues.”  The summit also endorsed “creation of regional task force 
sub-groups to work on fleet reduction and fleet behavior strategies” and recommended “a 






A task force, consisting of six legislators and nine industry and community representatives, 
created by the legislature in 2002 “to address those elements of the crisis in the Alaska 
industry that can be solved through governmental policy” and “through action on the part 
of industry.”  The Task Force in turn formed five subcommittees consisting of task force 
and public members, to address issues of finance, governance, marketing, production, and 
quality.   After conducting extensive public hearings during its first year, the Task Force 
was extended for a second year.  The Task Force received over 279 proposals from the 
public and eventually introduced 14 pieces of legislation in 2003 and 13 in 2204, with over 
half passing the legislature. Most of the bills dealt with marketing and taxation; very few 
raised restructuring issues. Examples include the creation of regional seafood development 
associations for marketing (HB 419), finfish labeling requirements (SB 282), and ASMI 
restructuring (SB 273).    
 
                                                 
8 Reports of most of these efforts are posted on the Web site of the Alaska Department of Community and Economic 
Development’s Office of Fisheries Development, at http://www.dced.state.ak.us/oed/seafood/seafoodreports.htm. 
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Several general themes have emerged from these efforts.  Repeatedly, there have been calls for 
the industry to improve the quality of Alaska salmon; to become more market oriented; to 
develop new products; to develop new markets (in particular the U.S. domestic market); and to 
invest more in marketing: 
 
“The Task Force recognizes that the entire seafood industry must improve the 
inherent quality of the salmon it processes, the freshness and workmanship of the 
product, and the consistency of grading to remain competitive, particularly when 
competing with farmed salmon. . . (Salmon Strategy Task Force, 1992) 
 
“[The state] should contract a major marketing research firm . . . to develop and 
analyze the “facts” related to salmon market trends, opportunities, and 
weaknesses in major and potential markets.  The group should also evaluate the 
state and industry’s marketing efforts . . . to permit, if possible, a more effective 
approach to marketing Alaska seafood.”  (Salmon Strategy Task Force, 1992) 
 
 “Without improved quality and product consistency, Alaska salmon is ill-suited 
to compete with farmed salmon on the whole fish market and unable to meet the 
quality and consistency standards required for long shelf-life as convenience-form 
frozen food products.” (Recovering World Leadership in Salmon:  A Strategic 
and Tactical Plan for the State of Alaska, 1993)  
 
“We will collectively move the salmon industry from a production-driven fish 
industry to a market-driven food industry that knows its customers. . . We must 
build in predictability and consistency for the buyers of Alaska salmon.” (Salmon 
Strategy Forum, 1997) 
 
“Alaska’s fisheries and the industry must be managed for quality. . . We need to 
plug the ‘leaks’ in the quality pipeline.” (Salmon Forum II, 1998). 
 
 “The Alaska Fish Summit recommended a marketing vision for Alaska to 
develop the brand and stick with the strengths of Alaska salmon.  The state and 
industry should develop a comprehensive marketing strategy, moving beyond 
promotion of Alaska salmon.  Quality should be tied to marketing, including 
consideration of state incentives for promoting quality.”  (Summary of 
Recommendations of the Alaska Fish Summit, 2002) 
 
A wide variety of other themes and proposals has also emerged:  the need for better cold storage 
and transportation infrastructure, and the need to overcome traditional divisions within the 
industry between gear groups, between different regions, and between processors and fishermen.  
The “priorities for action” identified by the “Sounding Board” of the 1999 Salmon Forum 
(shown on the following page) provide a typical example of the “quality,” “marketing,” and 
other themes emerging from Alaska’s salmon strategy debate.   
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Priorities for Action Identified by the “Sounding Board” of the 1999 Salmon Forum 
INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE.  1. Form a coalition for an industry-wide united voice in Juneau and Anchorage. The 
focus would be to help decision-makers and urban residents recognize the importance of the seafood industry to all 
of Alaska. The coalition would: aggressively support and defend a workable budget for ADF&G, seafood inspection 
programs at DEC, and ASMI’s salmon marketing initiatives.  2.  Organize an annual industry fly-in during the 
legislative session.  3.  Get Anchorage/Railbelt area permit holders, processors, and support services politically 
involved.  
 
FISHERMEN 1. Improve quality through proper handling and chilling wherever possible. For those quality-
conscious fishermen, continue to deliver quality salmon and encourage other fishermen to do likewise. 2. Organize 
quality-conscious fishermen and appropriate local processors for regional salmon marketing efforts similar to the 
Copper River effort. 3. In Bristol Bay, continue efforts to address fleet or gear consolidation.  
 
PROCESSORS. 1. Help create consistency in consumers’ expectation of quality and at a minimum use ASMI 
quality standards as a foundation for individual plant grading standards. 2. Include fishermen in discussions on short 
and long-term marketing strategies; explore ways to achieve those goals together. 3. Create and use incentives for 
promoting quality and loyalty to new and/or expanding markets and products.  
 
ADF&G 1. Continue pre-season regional meetings with industry representatives to set in-season parameters for 
maximizing quality and efficiency. 2. Initiate pre-season regional meetings with processors and shippers to 
determine if in-season modifications are possible for meeting key marketing events and schedules. 3. Expand timely 
collection of salmon wholesale value and harvest information including at a minimum one more COAR report.  
4. Seek consistency in the enforcement of regulations, such as roe stripping.  
 
ASMI. 1. Expand marketing efforts to positively differentiate wild salmon from farmed salmon. 2. Capitalize on 
health benefits of wild salmon, including obtaining a heart-healthy certification, such as the American Heart 
Association. 3. Continue to seek outside funding sources for salmon marketing efforts. 4. Develop and support 
marketing strategies that differentiate Alaska salmon from endangered salmon, including eco-labeling programs.  
 
DCED.   1.  Achieve credible organic certification for wild salmon. 2. Promote regional salmon marketing in a 
manner that does not lead to consumer confusion or fractionalization. 3. Pursue quality seal research and pilot 
project. 4. Serve as a clearinghouse for performance information on different pin bone machines.  
 
BOF.  1. Amend board proposal form to include a question about quality impacts of fish harvest. 2. Inject concern 
for improving quality and economic efficiency into board discussion. 3. Absent major allocation 
repercussions, support those proposals that improve quality and efficiency.  
 
ASTF. 1. Continue funding and support for pin bone removal projects. 2. Follow-up on projects/proposals to extend 
shelf life of fresh salmon, such as using ozone in slush ice; work closely with DEC on these projects.  
 
DEC.  1. Be receptive and responsive to ASTF projects that demonstrate how shelf life can be extended while 
complying with food safety and inspection requirements. 2. Initiate a state organic labeling program that relies on 
credible private certifiers and industry to cover inspection and costs. 3. Seek consistency in the enforcement of food 
safety regulations.  
Source:  Proceedings of the Alaska Salmon Forum 99.  www.dced.state.ak.us/oed/seafood/pub/forum99.pdf 
Note:  Underlined and bolded recommendations relate to restructuring.
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Despite repeated calls for action, the state government has done relatively little to address many 
of the themes arising from the salmon strategy debate.  The legislature, facing declining state 
revenues, has ended all state funding of salmon marketing (except for funds derived from federal 
grants).  With the industry unable to reach consensus on quality or grading standards, the state 
has not imposed such standards.  The state has done nothing to change the fundamental 
economic challenges facing the salmon industry. 
 
Restructuring in the Salmon Strategy Debate 
From the beginning of the salmon strategy debate, part of the discussion has focused on the 
effects of salmon management regulations on costs and quality, as well as the broader issue of 
“restructuring” the management of Alaska salmon fisheries.9  Various reports and forums have 
called for studying potential changes in regulations and management: 
 
The Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, DCED and DF&G, should develop 
fishery management and regulatory measures aimed at reducing operating costs, 
more efficiently utilizing present investments, and promoting a rational 
sustainable industry.  Investigate ways to retain permits in Alaska and rural areas 
in particular, provide greater stability and enhanced revenues to resident 
fishermen, and increased shoreside investment consistent with sound financial 
standards, through (a) reexamination of loan policies and permit use limitations, 
and (b) reexamination of Alaska’s limited entry system.  (Salmon Strategy Task 
Force, 1992) 
 
Reduce the cost of production.  An overcapitalized harvesting fleet [contributes] 
to increased production costs.  Permit buy back programs financed by the state or 
by fishermen should be investigated. (Alaska Department of Commerce and 
Economic Development, Scenario Planning:  Developing a Strategy for the 
Future of the Alaska Salmon Industry, 1993) 
 
Review and modify existing regulations which constrain the achievement of 
maximum intrinsic value of our many fishery resources. . . . Lower operational 
and capital costs by fishery and gear groups.  Remove gear requirements that 
reduce efficiencies. . . (Strategic Solutions Consulting Group,  Proceedings of the 
Alaska Salmon Strategy Forum, 1997)  
 
                                                 
9The term “restructuring” is generally used to refer to major changes in the management of a fishery undertaken 
primarily for economic or social reasons, rather than for conservation reasons.  Restructuring generally is intended 
to change how and by whom fish are harvested, rather than how many fish are harvested.  Some advocates refer to 
restructuring as “rationalization”—because they believe that changes would result in more “rational” fisheries 
management.   
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Initiate a review of the state’s long-run goals for the commercial salmon industry 
and the combined effect of the different state policies which affect the salmon 
industry, including (but not limited to) constitutional standards, the limited entry 
system (including permit numbers), fisheries management and allocation, vessel 
and gear regulations. . .  The Limited Entry Commission should undertake an 
analysis of options for fleet consolidation. This should include (a) implications of 
different options for cost efficiency and other goals; (b) review of potential legal 
and constitutional constraints and ways of overcoming them; (c) administrative or 
legislative actions needed to implement different options; and d) options to 
safeguard Alaska’s resident small boat fleet wherever possible. Options should be 
examined on a fishery-by-fishery basis. Have Board of Fisheries hold a work 
session on how and why cost efficiency strategies and quality involves them.  
(Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Salmon Forum II 
Report, 1998)   
 
The Alaska Fish Summit endorsed creation of regional task force sub-groups to 
work on fleet reduction and fleet-behavior strategies. . . (Information Insights, 
Report on 2002 Alaska Fish Summit) 
 
However, despite these calls to study the issues, Alaskans have engaged in little substantive 
discussion of restructuring.  In general—as illustrated by the 1999 Salmon Forum priorities for 
action summarized above—restructuring has been a lesser theme in Alaska’s salmon strategy 
debate, receiving less discussion and less follow-up than other themes.   
 
Since the beginning of the salmon crisis, there has been relatively little change in Alaska salmon 
management.  (The one notable exception is the Chignik salmon fishery, which we discuss later 
in this paper.)  In most fisheries, the management remains very similar to what it was in the late 
1980s, at the peak of value and prosperity in the Alaska salmon industry.   
 
However, serious discussion of restructuring is beginning.  Over the coming year, at the request 
of the Joint Legislative Salmon Industry Task Force, a “Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel” 
established by the Board of Fisheries’ will study the issues raised by restructuring proposals and 
make recommendations to the legislature about how to address them.   
 
If the Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel is to engage Alaskans in a productive discussion of 
restructuring that could lead to real change, it is important for Alaskans to understand the 
obstacles that have hampered discussions of restructuring so far.  Why has so little change 
occurred?  What needs to happen for change to occur? 
 
We suggest that numerous factors have combined to make it inherently difficult to debate and 
bring about significant changes in salmon management regulations:  the diversity of Alaska 
salmon fisheries; the complexity and highly controversial nature of the issues; uncertainty of 
stakeholders over the implications and potential impacts of changes; and the uncertainty over 
what changes may or may not be constitutional.  Aggravating these inherent challenges is an 
institutional problem:  the absence of clear responsibility and authority within state government 
for the economic success of Alaska’s fisheries.    
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Inherent Challenges in Restructuring Alaska Salmon Management 
 
Diversity of Alaska Salmon Fisheries 
Alaska has more than 25 limited-entry salmon fisheries, including 21 fisheries with more than 
100 permits and 18 fisheries that had a catch value greater than $1 million in 2001.  These 
fisheries vary widely in species, gear, markets, catch, and price trends.  
 
Table 3 



























 Southeast  Purse Seine 48.8 251.2 415 45% 83% $141,339 $34,700
 Bristol Bay  Drift Gillnet 32.4 80.6 1,885 51% 83% $20,699 $34,700
 Prince William Sd.  Drift Gillnet 21.2 26.4 541 73% 96% $40,682 $57,500
 Kodiak  Purse Seine 17.1 81.7 384 75% 47% $93,727 $17,100
 Statewide  Power Troll 16.2 18.3 965 80% 73% $23,073 $13,000
 Prince William Sd.  Purse Seine 12.9 83.8 268 73% 55% $87,498 $21,400
 Southeast  Drift Gillnet 12.5 27.4 482 74% 90% $28,845 $41,300
 Bristol Bay  Set Gillnet 8.5 20.8 1,010 72% 83% $10,181 $25,300
 Chignik  Purse Seine 8.4 17.7 98 85% 94% $91,425 $185,800
 Kodiak  Set Gillnet 5.1 12.5 188 72% 91% $29,515 $101,800
 Cook Inlet  Set Gillnet 4.1 6.6 744 84% 68% $8,082 $10,600
 Cook Inlet  Drift Gillnet 3.7 6.3 574 69% 81% $7,947 $22,300
 Ak Peninsula  Drift Gillnet 3.6 7.8 160 50% 86% $26,623 $123,000
 Ak Pen./Aleut. Is.  Purse Seine 2.9 22.0 121 74% 53% $45,983 $48,800
 Ak Peninsula  Set Gillnet 2.0 5.7 113 83% 87% $20,027 $73,300
 Prince William Sd.  Set Gillnet 1.3 1.6 30 83% 100% $44,732 $60,300
 Yakutat  Set Gillnet 1.1 3.1 169 80% 67% $9,954 $27,400
 Statewide  Hand Troll 1.0 1.0 1,295 88% 24% $3,318 $4,100
 Kuskokwim  Set Gillnet 0.8 2.6 818 99% 63% $1,562 $7,000
 Cook Inlet  Purse Seine 0.7 1.9 83 90% 30% $28,844 $15,800
 Kotzebue  Set Gillnet 0.3 1.8 190 96% 34% $4,973 $2,000
 Norton Sound  Set Gillnet 0.1 0.2 190 98% 27% $1,233 $4,500
 Kodiak  Beach Seine 0.0 0.0 34 85% 0% $0 $16,400
 Upper Yukon  Fish Wheel 0.0 0.0 157 98% 0% $0 $7,700
 Lower Yukon  Set Gillnet 0.0 0.0 701 99% 0% $0 $11,500
 Upper Yukon  Set Gillnet 0.0 0.0 72 99% 0% $0 $7,500
 Total, All Fisheries 204.7 681.1 11,687 76% 63% $29,625 $37,492
Source:  Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Basic Information Tables for Alaska salmon fisheries.  
 
The diversity of Alaska salmon fisheries makes it difficult just to describe the issues associated 
with salmon management.  Cost and quality issues vary widely between gear types and regions. 
The extent to which the number of permits or boats exceed what is needed to harvest the 
available fish also varies among individual fisheries, as does the feasibility of particular 
restructuring options such as co-ops.  Clearly there is no single problem or single solution.  This 
means that many of the issues can only be addressed on a fishery-by-fishery basis.  
 
But other issues are inherently statewide—such as legal issues associated with restructuring or 
restrictions on participation in multiple fisheries.  The combination of fishery-specific and 
 18  
statewide issues makes it inherently challenging to determine who should be involved in 
discussions of restructuring.  
 
Complexity of the Issues 
For any specific Alaska salmon fishery, restructuring is not a single issue or option, but rather a 
very wide range of issues and options.  Although much of the discussion about restructuring has 
been about fleet reduction—in particular buybacks—there are a much wider range of options for 
changing fishery management to reduce costs and increase value.  They range from relatively 
simple changes such as “permit stacking” (allowing permit holders to combine operations and 
fish more gear from a single boat) to major changes such as co-ops.  In the extreme, restructuring 
could conceivably mean changing from limited entry to a different kind of management system, 
such as one based on quota shares.   
 
Option Rationale Selected Design Issues Selected Concerns
Divide permit holders 
into groups which fish at 
different times
Reduces total 
boat and fuel costs
What is the basis for dividing permit 
holders into groups?
Fishing opportunities may 
differ between groups
Allow permit holders to 
combine operations and 
fish more gear from one 
boat (permit stacking)
Reduces total 
boat and fuel costs
How much gear do combined 
operations get to use?
Potential for participation by 
permits that would have gone 
unfished--thus increasing 
total gear use
Permit buybacks Reduces boat and 
fuel costs
Which permits get bought out, and for 
what price?
Who pays for buybacks?
Cost of buybacks
Increased investment by 
remaming boats




Group of individual 
quotas
Ends "race for 
fish" & focuses 
effort on reducing 
costs & 
improving quality
What is the basis for allocations?
Are allocations fished simulatenously 
or sequentially?
Are allocations temporary or 
permanent?
Are allocations transferable?




Degree of local participation
Payments for "not fishing"
Changes in boat 
restrictions
Changes in gear
Reduces costs and 
enhances quality
Should restrictions be similar in 
different fisheries?
Over what period of time are changes 
phased in?
Loss in value of original 
boats or gear
Access to funding for new 
boats or gear
Examples of Potential Restructuring Options for Alaska Salmon Fisheries
 
 
Associated with each broad restructuring option are numerous design issues that profoundly 
influence how different fishermen and communities might be affected by restructuring.  For 
example, who would benefit from a “buyback” of fishing permits clearly depends on who would 
have to pay for it.  Who benefits from a co-op depends on how the co-op profits are divided 
among the participants.  
 
Restructuring would have complex economic and social implications.  How different 
stakeholders would be affected by different options is far from clear.  The long-term effects may 
be different—and more profound—than the short-term effects.  Restructuring would also result 
in new challenges for fisheries managers in meeting biological objectives, as a result of potential 
changes in fishing fleets, fishing gear, or fishery participants.  
 19  
 
Constitutional Issues 
Restructuring of Alaska salmon fisheries raises complex constitutional issues.10  Many of these 
derive from the constitutional requirements that fisheries are “reserved to the people for common 
use” and that “no exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized.”  
Thus changes in fisheries management that reduce the number of participants, or create 
“privileges”—such as quota shares for groups or individuals—run the risk of being found 
unconstitutional and declared invalid after they have been implemented.  Some kinds of 
restructuring might only be possible through amendments to the Alaska constitution.  
 
Many kinds of changes might or might not be constitutional, depending on how they are 
designed.  It is impossible to be assured of their constitutionality until after they are adopted, 
challenged, litigated, and decided by the Alaska Supreme Court. 
 
This constitutional uncertainty poses risks that efforts to achieve changes in salmon management 
will be for naught.  A 1998 study by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission that briefly 
reviewed restructuring options pointed out that: 
 
. . Under our state constitution, a limited fishery can become too exclusive, 
requiring the state to add more permits back into the fishery to make the limited 
fishery constitutional.  In other words, money could be invested in a buy out 
program, but a court could, subsequently, require permits to be added back into 
the fishery. This is a risk for those who would pay for a buy out program. The 
degree of risk must be assessed on a fishery-by-fishery basis.11 
 
This constitutional risk—and the difficulty of getting clear answers about just how risky different 
kinds of changes might be—serves to discourage individuals in both industry and government 
from investing significant effort to achieve restructuring.   
 
Controversy 
Restructuring is a very controversial topic.  The stakes are high, and restructuring involves 
difficult tradeoffs between social and economic objectives. 
 
Any change in fisheries management affects different fishermen, different gear groups, and 
different communities if different ways.  Proposed management changes that would benefit 
fishermen wouldn’t necessarily benefit processors—and vice versa.  Even a change in 
management specific to a particular fishery may provoke opposition in other areas, as 
stakeholders worry that the changes may set a precedent for what changes may occur, and how 
they may occur, in other areas.   
 
For all these reasons and others, the fishing industry and fishing communities are divided about 
whether management changes are needed, and if so, what kinds of changes are needed.  Private 
                                                 
10 University of Alaska Marine Advisory Program, “Charting New Courses for Alaska Salmon Fisheries:  The Legal 
Waters” (November 2003) provides a more detailed overview of constitutional issues associated with restructuring. 
11 Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Outline of Options for Fleet Consolidation in Alaska’s Salmon 
Fisheries (1998). 
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industry associations and membership groups, such as the United Fishermen of Alaska, often 
find it difficult to recommend comprehensive changes due to lack of consensus.   In turn, the 
lack of consensus within the industry makes legislators reluctant to embrace changes that might 
hurt some constituents. 
 
A useful example of the complexity and controversy of restructuring is provided by the 
discussion of fleet reduction among breakout groups at the “Salmon Forum ’99,” as summarized 
in the forum proceedings (on the following page).  Different concerns and attitudes towards 
restructuring were expressed in different regions, and by different individuals and gear groups 
within regions.  A common theme was that “regions are unique” and that “one regional solution 
should not affect other areas.”  Many people were clearly opposed to any kind of fleet reduction, 
while those who supported fleet reduction had different concepts of how it might be done.  
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Summary of Discussion of Fleet Reduction by Breakout Groups at Salmon Forum ’99 
 
SELECTED SOUTHEAST ALASKA 
RESPONSES 
In a fleet survey of 400 by AIFMA, 95% of 
fishermen were interested in buyback. 
Look at the AIFMA model for buyback. Setnetters in Yakutat are opposed to fleet 
reduction. We prefer federal buyback up front. 
Southeast Seiners has started looking at it, but 
first need more information and dialogue. Slow the pace to deal with boats. 
The plan must include setnets too. Alaska Trollers Association looked at it before 
and opposes it because it wouldn’t benefit the 
remaining fleet. [76% power troll permits were 
fished in 1997, therefore 24% unfished; 27% of 
handtroll permits unfished; buyback might not 
have any effect.] 
Consider a sliding gear scale until a buyback can 
be put in place. 
The NMFS buyback program sounds good to 
many. 
Avoid sudden buyout because of boat glut and 
other adjustment problems. Fleet reduction shouldn’t be a knee-jerk response to recent issues and turmoil. 
Room poll: fleet reduction, any type: yes, 25; no, 
6. We should preserve the ability to enter the fishery for future fishers. 
SELECTED COPPER RIVER AND PRINCE 
WILLIAM SOUND RESPONSES 
Too much exclusivity will hurt industry. 
Highs and lows come and go as part of a natural 
cycle. It’s not a problem. 
There are 150 too many permits; increase 
efficiency; 250 boats can provide adequate 
harvest. 
Fleet reduction could mean fewer fish-
related/support jobs in communities. 
Fleets today are more efficient than in the 70s. Exclusive area/vessel registration opposition 
may make the other 50% of the seine fleet active. Buyback could result in reallocation to sportfish. 
Further discussions may have to be tailored to 
specific fisheries; it is hard to educate the public 
except generically. 
Where will the buyout money come from? 
SELECTED KODIAK/COOK 
INLET/CHIGNIK RESPONSES 
A buyback would need structure to be effective 
(not just unfished permits). We don’t need a buy-out program. Let the free market control the number of active permits. 
Permit stacking is an interesting idea that should 
be explored. Caution/concern needs to be exercised that one regional solution should not affect other areas. 
Communities should buy back permits and hold 
them, rather than the state (it is not legal now for 
communities to hold permits). 
Clean up the statute to allow fishermen to 
conduct their own buyback program 
No consolidation. Pursue diversification for 
more opportunities Regions are unique. 
Southeast doesn’t need a buyback program now; 
not enough information now to make a decision; 
but consider the long-term and keep looking at 
options. 
Promote efficiency (processing and harvesting) 
This group doesn’t want to explore any option 
that reduces permits. 
SELECTED BRISTOL BAY RESPONSES  
It is a management problem. Source:  Proceedings of the Alaska Salmon 
Forum 99.  Www.dced.state.ak.us/oed/seafood/ Court cases limit options. pub/forum99.pdf 
Fleet reduction should be voluntary only.  
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The Institutional Challenge in Restructuring 
Adding to these inherent challenges in restructuring is a fundamental institutional problem:  the 
absence of clear responsibility and authority within state government for the economic success of 
Alaska’s fisheries.  Put simply, part of the reason that restructuring—major changes in the 
management of Alaska salmon fisheries to improve the economic viability of the industry—has 
not occurred is that the legislature has not undertaken such changes, nor has it delegated clear 
authority to any other agency to make such changes.  
 
The Alaska Legislature has the constitutional responsibility and authority for the management of 
Alaska’s fishery resources.  Over time, the legislature has delegated parts of this management 
authority to a number of different agencies.  But it has not delegated clear responsibility, 
authority and ability to any agency to ensure the economic viability of the salmon industry, or to 
restructure Alaska salmon management for the purpose of strengthening the economic viability 
of the industry.  Nor has it provided the necessary resources to any agency for economic analysis 
to consider and understand the economic impact of the resource protection and allocation 
decisions that they make.  Unless and until the legislature assumes or clearly delegates this 
responsibility and authority—as well as the necessary resources—restructuring is unlikely to 
occur in most salmon fisheries. 
 
The Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game have a clear mandate to 
conserve Alaska’s salmon resources, and authority to enact regulations necessary to achieve that 
objective.  But that mandate and authority do not extend to the more complex and difficult 
constitutionally-mandated objective of managing Alaska’s salmon resources for the “maximum 
benefit” of Alaskans.  There is no clear definition of “maximum benefit” or the extent to which 
economic viability is encompassed in this objective.  The Board and the Department do not have 
a clear responsibility or mandate to manage salmon fisheries for economic viability. 
 
The Board of Fisheries is primarily responsible for allocating the fisheries resource among users 
(commercial, sport, subsistence, and personal use) based on historical practices and fairness, 
within the bounds of biological limits.  Its mission is silent on its authority and responsibility to 
consider the economic viability of the fisheries. The board’s January 2002 decision to authorize 
an allocation to the Chignik co-op, to enhance the economic viability of that fishery, is being 
challenged in the Alaska Supreme Court on the grounds that the decision was outside of the 
board’s statutory authority.  (We discuss limits to the board’s authority and ability to address 
restructuring in greater detail below.) 
 
The Department of Fish and Game has the statutory mandate to protect fishery resources and to 
manage for sustained yield. It must undertake the necessary biological analyses to assure 
adequate escapements and protect the waters and habitat that are essential for the health of the 
species. But it does not have a mandate or authority to regulate specifically for the purpose of 
improving the economic viability of a fishery.  
 
The Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) implements Alaska’s limited entry law, 
which establishes the general framework for determining how many permits may be fished in 
each salmon fishery, who may hold and fish those permits, and how the number of permits may 
be changed.  CFEC has the authority to undertake certain kinds of restructuring, such as a buy-
 23  
back program, but only as specifically provided for under the limited entry law.  As we discuss 
below, there are problems with the “optimum number” and buyback provisions of the limited 
entry law, as a result of which there have been no buybacks and no significant reductions in the 
number of permits issued in any Alaska salmon fishery, despite more than a decade of economic 
crisis in the industry.  Only the legislature—not CFEC—can change the limited entry law to 
address these problems. 
 
Other state government agencies also have only limited responsibility and authority for 
management of salmon fisheries.  For example, the Department of Commerce and Economic 
Development is charged with promoting economic development in Alaska, including the fishing 
industry, but it has no authority over fisheries management.  The Alaska Seafood Marketing 
Institute (ASMI) is charged with marketing Alaska seafood, but also has no authority over 
management—even though management may directly affect the effectiveness of Alaska seafood 
marketing.  The Habitat Division of the Alaska Department of fish and Game was charged with 
protecting waters and habitat—which are essential to the health of Alaska fish resources—until 
2003, when that function was transferred to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR).  
Water quality is regulated by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. 
 
An example of the absence of clear responsibility and authority for restructuring is provided by a 
recommendation of the 1997 Salmon Strategy Forum, which called for a “review of the state’s 
long-run goals for the commercial salmon industry and the combined effect of the different state 
policies which affect the salmon industry, including (but not limited to) constitutional standards, 
the limited entry system (including permit numbers), fisheries management and allocation, vessel 
and gear regulations, state loan programs, the hatchery program, and marketing.”12  It was not 
clear who should conduct the review—and it required the participation of numerous different 
agencies.  
 
The review should be based within a designated agency or commission (or the 
Salmon Cabinet) and should seek broad input from different sectors of the 
industry. The purpose of the review should be to examine whether state policies 
are consistent with long-run goals and with each other, and what kinds of major 
policy changes may be needed. . . . The Limited Entry Commission should 
undertake an analysis of options for fleet consolidation. . . .. Have Board of 
Fisheries hold a work session on how and why cost efficiency strategies and 
quality involves them . . . The work session should involve the ASMI Board of 
Directors. Staff from Commercial Fisheries Management and Development 
identifies regulations that promote inefficiencies, i.e. gear and vessel 
requirements. [emphasis added] 
 
Another example of absence of clear responsibility and authority for restructuring is provided in 
the report of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission outlining options for fleet 
consolidation in Alaska’s salmon fisheries, undertaken in response to a request of the 1998 
Salmon Forum II.   The report briefly described a number of options, concluding each 
description with a short summary of “how to undertake” the option. For only one option—
                                                 
12 Strategic Solutions Consulting Group, Proceedings of the Alaska Salmon Strategy Forum, January 27-29, 1997.  
Available at http://www.dced.state.ak.us/oed/seafood/seafoodreports.htm. 
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authorizing an alternative gear type—was it clear who would have the responsibility and 
authority for making the change. 
 
Option "How to Undertake"
Authorize an alternative gear 
type
Petition the Board of Fisheries and the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission for a 
change of regulation.
Exclusive Fishing Group 
Registration
Seek a regulation from the Alaska Board of Fisheries. It would be necessary to persuade 
the Board such a regulatory provision would serve management needs and would be 
authorized under the Board’s existing statutory authority. 
State-Managed, Fisherman-
Financed Buy Out Program
A change of state law would be required. Discuss proposed legislation with Entry 
Commission, Department of Fish and Game, members of the Board of Fisheries, the 
Attorney General, legislative attorneys and legislators. Any legislative proposal would 
require serious work by interested private individuals. Constitutional risks . . . would be 
present in such a program. A careful examination of the risks on a fishery-by-fishery 
basis, and, ultimately, an optimum number study would be required to undertake a buy 
out program.
Cooperatives Locate existing cooperatives and learn from their experience. Consult with potential 
cooperative members to determine their interest. Consult with a knowledgeable attorney.
Authorize a Single Individual to 
hold two or more Entry Permits 
in the same Fishery and Fish an 
Incremental amount of 
Additional
Gear.
Discuss proposed legislation with Entry Commission, Department of Fish and Game, 
Department of Public Safety, members of the Board of Fisheries, the Attorney General, 
legislative attorneys and legislators. Any legislative proposal would require serious work 
by interested private individuals.
Fractional entry permits Discuss proposed legislation with the Entry Commission, Department of Fish and Game, 
members of the Board of Fisheries, the Attorney General, legislative attorneys and 
Legislators. Any legislative proposal would require serious work by interested private 
individuals.
Individual fishing quotas First, talk to in-season managers of the fishery to assess the feasibility of an IFQ program 
for a particular salmon fishery. Then, if feasible, discuss proposed legislation with Entry 
Commission, Department of Fish and Game, members of the Board of Fisheries, the 
Attorney General, legislative attorneys and Legislators. Any legislative proposal would 
require serious work by interested private individuals.
How to Undertake Selected Restructuring Options, as Described in a CFEC Report
Source:  Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Outline of Options for Fleet Consolidation in Alaska’s Salmon 
Fisheries  (1998).   
 
The continuing uncertainty over the responsibility and authority for restructuring was apparent in 
the conclusions of a recent report, commissioned by the Bristol Bay Economic Development 
Corporation, which analyzed options for restructuring the Bristol Bay salmon fishery:13 
 
If restructuring actions are chosen, we further recommend: [1] The task of 
designing restructuring options should be done by those most familiar with the 
fishery. [2] One or more organizations take the lead in bringing together 
representatives of all groups in the fishery to design a restructuring action that all 
parties can support. 
 
                                                 
13 Link et al, An Analysis of Options to Restructure the Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery (2003). 
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Put simply, the state government, and in particular the legislature, has not taken the lead in 
facilitating and enabling restructuring—even though the state has sole authority for the 
management of Alaska’s salmon fisheries.  Those interested in promoting change in salmon 
management to improve the fisheries’ economic viability have been on their own—in developing 
proposals, analyzing the issues, finding consensus, and figuring out who in state government—if 
anyone—has authority to make the changes.  
 
Constraints to Restructuring Under the Limited Entry Law 
In the 1970s, the legislature adopted limited entry legislation to “promote the conservation and 
the sustained yield management of Alaska's fishery resource and the economic health and 
stability of commercial fishing.”14  The law directed the Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission (CFEC) to establish “optimum numbers of permits” for each fishery, based in part 
on economic considerations: 15  
 
“. . . The commission shall establish the optimum number of entry permits for 
each fishery based on a reasonable balance of the following general standards: 
 
(1) the number of entry permits sufficient to maintain an economically 
healthy fishery that will result in a reasonable average rate of economic 
return to the fishermen participating in that fishery, considering time 
fished and necessary investments in vessels and gear 
 
(2) the number of entry permits necessary to harvest the allowable 
commercial take of the fishery resource during all years in an orderly, 
efficient manner, and consistent with sound fishery management 
techniques 
 
(3) the number of entry permits sufficient to avoid serious economic 
hardship to those currently engaged in the fishery, considering other 
economic opportunities reasonably available to them 
 
The law also provided a mechanism for adjusting the number of permits in response to changes 
in economic considerations: 16  
 
. . . The commission may increase or decrease the optimum number of entry 
permits for a fishery when one or more of the following conditions makes a 
change desirable . . . : 
 
(1) an established long-term change in the biological condition of the 
fishery has occurred . . .; 
 
                                                 
14 AS 16.43.010.  Emphasis added. 
15 AS 16.43.290.  Emphasis added. 
16 AS 16.43.300.  Emphasis added. 
 26  
(2) an established long-term change in market conditions has occurred, 
directly affecting the fishery, that substantially alters the optimum number 
of entry permits permissible . . . . 
 
(b) If the commission decreases the optimum number of entry permits for 
a fishery, the number of entry permits may be reduced only under the 
voluntary buy-back provisions [as set out in other parts of the legislation]. 
 
Clearly, these provisions have not functioned as originally intended under the law.  Prior to 2004, 
CFEC had never established or recommended an “optimum number” of permits for any Alaska 
salmon fishery.  CFEC completed its first analysis of the “optimum number” of permits for any 
Alaska salmon fishery in October 2004.17   
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s CFEC did not pursue analysis of “optimum numbers” because 
economic conditions were rapidly improving in the fisheries.  CFEC was preoccupied with legal 
challenges to limited entry and whether it provided enough access to the fishery, rather than with 
whether there might be too many permits.  By the late 1990s, with the salmon industry facing 
deteriorating economic conditions, CFEC was cautioning the industry that optimum number 
studies and buyouts—as provided for under the limited entry law—were of uncertain economic 
benefit, and were constitutionally risky:18 
 
. . . If optimism associated with a buy out program generates substantial additional 
capital investment by remaining fishermen, beneficial results of buy out could be 
dissipated over time.  Additionally, under our state constitution, a limited fishery 
can become too exclusive, requiring the state to add more permits back into the 
fishery to make the limited fishery constitutional. In other words, money could be 
invested in a buy out program, but a court could, subsequently, require permits to 
be added back into the fishery. This is a risk for those who would pay for a buy 
out program. The degree of risk must be assessed on a fishery-by-fishery basis. 
 
In effect, CFEC was saying that the only mechanism provided by the limited entry law for 
adjusting permit numbers to improve the economic viability of Alaska salmon fisheries might be 
both economically ineffective as well as unconstitutional.  To the extent that this was or is the 
case, clearly only the legislature—and not CFEC—can address this situation. 
 
The optimum number study completed by CFEC for the Bristol Bay drift gillnet fishery in 
October 2004 reiterated that a Bristol Bay buyback “may require more statutory changes.”  It 
also noted that alternative approaches to restructuring, such as cooperative management, might 
allow for “economic profits per permit much higher than forecasted in this report” (by changing 
only the number of permits). 19  
                                                 
17Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Bristol Bay Salmon Drift Gillnet Fishery Optimum Number Report, 
CFEC Report 04-3N, October 2004. 
18 Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Outline of Options for Fleet Consolidation in Alaska’s Salmon 
Fisheries (1998). 
19Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Bristol Bay Salmon Drift Gillnet Fishery Optimum Number Report, 
CFEC Report 04-3N, October 2004, page 137. 
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Limits to the Board of Fisheries’ Ability to Address Restructuring 
The legislature established the Board of Fisheries “for purposes of the conservation and 
development of the fishery resources of the state.”20  Historically, the board has primarily been 
concerned with allocating the fisheries resource among users (commercial, sport, subsistence, 
and personal use) based on historical practices and fairness, within the bounds of biological 
limits.   
 
The board’s mission is silent on the board’s authority and responsibility to consider the economic 
viability of the fisheries.  Some people argue that the board has and should use this authority.  
Clearly, the board’s January 2002 decision to authorize an allocation to the Chignik co-op was 
undertaken to enhance the economic viability of that fishery.  Whether the board had the 
authority to do so was an important part of the debate over the Chignik co-op and is being 
challenged in the Alaska Supreme Court (as discussed below).  Until this uncertainty is resolved, 
it will clearly remain a major disincentive to any group contemplating the effort, time, and 
expense of bringing a restructuring proposal before the board. 
 
Regardless of its statutory authority, from a practical standpoint, the overworked and 
understaffed Board of Fisheries currently has neither the time nor the resources to manage 
Alaska salmon fisheries for economic viability or to address the complex issues involved in 
restructuring.  The board members are volunteers who spend more than eight weeks a year in 
meetings, responding to proposals, usually narrowly focused on a particular gear group.  The 
board is so overwhelmed that it must rotate its hearings on issues affecting different regions on a 
multi-year cycle.  Regardless of the stress one region might be experiencing, it could be three or 
four years before the board will have time to consider modifications.  Clearly, the board does not 
have the ability to generate proposals of its own that would deal with the statewide or even 
region-wide economic needs of the industry, even if it wanted to do so.  
 
The board has no research staff and no research budget.  Board members have no way to 
independently assess the economic condition of the fisheries, the economic impact of the 
resource protection and allocation decisions they make, the economic impact of any proposals 
for restructuring fisheries to make them more economically viable, or the validity of the 
economic arguments made by restructuring proponents or opponents.  Nor do they have any 
independent ability to assess even more complex potential social effects of restructuring. 
 
Restructuring proposals for any given area may have economic implications for other areas.  For 
example, reductions in the number of permit holders or boats fishing in one area may cause those 
individuals or boats to shift effort to other areas.  Most of the people attending board meetings, 
and most of the arguments presented by proponents or opponents of any specific restructuring 
proposal, are likely to be concerned primarily with the specific area for which management 
changes are proposed.  The board has no independent ability to consider potential economic 
effects on other areas. 
 
Not surprisingly, given these limitations, the board has usually adhered to established harvest 
patterns, making minor modifications, but not grappling with the magnitude and rate of changes 
                                                 
20 AS 16.05.251. 
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in effort, capability, or cumulative impact. Nor has it demonstrated the ability to anticipate 
systemic changes from either environmental or economic indicators, whether they be regime 
changes in ocean conditions brought on by the Pacific decadal oscillation or regime changes in 
economic conditions brought about by salmon farming. 
 
These observations are not new.  Similar observations were made in a 1987 report of the Alaska 
Senate Advisory Council—when the Alaska salmon industry was booming:21 
 
Today, there is greatly improved conservation management as a result of an 
emphasis on collecting the best available biological information and basing 
regulation on it. Conversely, the social and economic aspects of regulatory 
decisions still receive relatively short shrift.” 
 
Little of the information available to the Board of Fisheries addresses the socio-
economic implications of regulatory decisions…Neither the department nor the 
board has the staff capacity to evaluate such information and must accept it at face 
value or view it with caution if originating with a user group without being able to 
test it. Nor does the capability to develop independent analyses of proposals from 
any source exist. In many cases then, the Board must make allocation decisions 
without any opportunity to evaluate the long term consequences of those 
decisions. So too, many changes in regulations must be regarded as economic 
mysteries by affected user groups. 
  
The ability to look forward into the implications of other trends in the industry, 
such as mariculture and its affect on existing Alaskan fisheries and how it will 
figure in global markets, is also essential. Will policies of regulated inefficiency 
eventually price Alaskan seafood out of global markets? 
 
Lack of Action on Restructuring by the Alaska Legislature 
As noted above, the Alaska Legislature has the constitutional authority and responsibility to 
manage Alaska’s salmon fisheries for the “maximum benefit” of Alaskans.  But the legislature 
has neither assumed nor delegated clear responsibility, authority, and ability to restructure 
Alaska salmon management for the purpose of strengthening the economic viability of the 
industry.   
 
The most recent example of the reluctance of the legislature to address the complex and 
controversial issues associated with restructuring was provided by the 2002-2004 Joint 
Legislative Salmon Industry Task Force.  The legislature gave the Task Force a broad charge “to 
address those elements of the crisis in the Alaska salmon industry that can be solved through 
governmental policy.”  Restructuring was clearly encompassed within the mission statement 
adopted by Task Force “. . . to evaluate the State of Alaska’s statutory framework for Alaska’s 
wild salmon industry as well as current industry practices and to make recommendations for 
statutory, regulatory and structural changes that will improve the industry while recognizing 
Alaska’s coastal economy.”   
                                                 
21 Sheila Helgath and Richard Rainery. The Alaska Board of Fisheries:  Fisheries Management Alternatives (1987), 
pages 49, 48, 63. 
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However, the Task Force did relatively little to address the central issues associated with 
restructuring.  It conducted no research on economic or social issues related to restructuring.  
Fourteen pieces of legislation developed by the Task Force were enacted by the legislature.22 
Most of the bills dealt with issues other than restructuring.23  The two bills that had some 
restructuring implications addressed very specific issues, rather than the critical broad questions 
of who has responsibility and authority for restructuring, and the legal, economic, and social 
criteria for restructuring the management of salmon fisheries.24  Recognizing that additional 
work was needed to address these and other issues, the Task Force provided its remaining funds 
to the Board of Fish for the Board’s Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel. 
 
Why has the Alaska Legislature avoided substantively engaging the central issues associated 
with restructuring?  One reason is the complexity of fisheries management issues and the 
controversy and lack of consensus surrounding them.   Few legislators have sufficient knowledge 
of the various gear groups or regional differences in the structure and economics of those groups 
to feel comfortable imposing a change in management when there is no consensus among 
stakeholders. Even those who do so often give up after trying to find “the right balance,” as that 
balance is intensely disputed. If a legislator introduces a bill to change the allocation or 
harvesting process, the odds are high that another legislator will go to the rescue of the 
opponents of the proposal and will champion the status quo or some other alternative. Given the 
many other pressing issues before the legislature, from budgets to bills that are less controversial, 
proposed legislation related to fisheries restructuring is often tabled.  
 
Another reason is that the salmon industry has been shrinking in size, both economically and 
politically. Other industries—such as federal spending, oil and gas, tourism, and health care—
have eclipsed salmon fishing as economic engines of Alaska. The leadership of the business 
community and the government—as well as most urban voters—are more interested in and 
spend much more time and energy on discussing, promoting and developing other industries. In 
spite of the fact that much of coastal Alaska depends upon the salmon industry, it does not get 
much attention.  The agencies with responsibility for the salmon industry do not get much 
direction or support. 
                                                 
22 Joint Legislative Salmon Industry Task Force.  2004.  Summary of Legislation Passed 2002-04.   Available at 
http://www.ufa-fish.org/taskforce/sum_leg04.htm.   
23 Examples include the creation of regional seafood development associations for marketing (HB 419), finfish 
labeling requirements (SB 282), and changes in the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute (SB 273). 
24 HB 409 provides that the Board of Fish cannot “authorize the use of a vessel longer than 58 feet overall length in 
a salmon seine fishery…. unless at least 66 percent of the entry permit holders for that fishery favor the adoption of 
the regulation at a referendum conducted by the department.”  SB315 allows the Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission to conduct a referendum on the question of imposing a buy-back surcharge on the renewal of entry 
permits for a fishery, which can only be authorized with the approval of 66 percent of the entry permit holders in 
that fishery. 
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Restructuring Alaska Fisheries:  Lessons from Experience 
In the early 1970s, Alaska undertook significant restructuring of its salmon fisheries with the 
adoption of limited entry.  In January 2002, the Board of Fisheries approved major restructuring 
of the Chignik salmon fishery by approving an allocation to the Chignik salmon cooperative.  In 
the 1990s, the federal North Pacific Fishery Management Council dramatically restructured the 
management of the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries, and more recently the Bering Sea crab 
fisheries, with the adoption of IFQ management.  Below, we briefly review lessons that these 
experiences suggest about the opportunities and challenges for future restructuring of Alaska 
salmon fisheries.   
 
Alaska’s Adoption of Limited Entry 
For the first decade of statehood, Alaska managed its salmon fishery through a traditional 
conservation management mode.  A principle objective was to increase salmon runs, and a 
secondary objective was to expand benefits of the fishery to Alaskans, after many years of 
perceived injustices under federal management, which deferred to Seattle interests.  
 
However, in the late 1960s the combination of diminishing stocks and rapidly increasing 
numbers of fishermen prompted policymakers to consider alternatives for limiting the number of 
fishermen.25, 26  In 1967, Governor Walter Hickel, reacting to the lowest salmon harvest since 
1899, proposed to limit the number of fishermen who would be permitted to fish in Bristol Bay. 
The Board of Fisheries rejected the proposal from the Department of Fish and Game, after 
objections from fishermen and processors, and then developed its own version, which was ruled 
unconstitutional by the attorney general. 
 
In 1968, the legislature passed a limited entry law giving authority to the board to set eligibility 
criteria for permits based on previous experience. The board’s regulations were challenged and 
in 1969 a three judge federal panel found them unconstitutional under both the U.S. and Alaska 
constitutions. 
 
In 1971, Governor Egan proposed, and the legislature passed, a resolution amending Article 
VIII, section 15 of the Alaska Constitution—which prohibited creation or authorization of “any 
exclusive right of fishery--to allow limited entry “to prevent economic distress among fishermen 
and those dependent upon them for a livelihood.”  The amendment was passed by Alaska voters 
in 1972.27  
                                                 
25 “In the late 1960s, there were more than twice as many fishermen, who used more capital equipment to catch 
about 40 per cent as many fish as were taken in the 1930s, when production was at its peak.” J. Crutchfield and G. 
Pontecorvo, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries, a Study of Irrational Conservation (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press for 
Resources for the Future ,Inc., 1969), cited in Thomas Morehouse and Jack Hession, “Politics and Management: The 
Problem of Limited Entry,” in Arlon R. Tussing, Thomas A. Morehouse, and James D. Babb, Jr., eds.,  Alaska 
Fisheries Policy (UA Fairbanks, Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, 1972), page 304.   
26 The number of salmon gear licenses issued in Alaska increased from 5100 in 1960 to 8923 in 1970 (Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, cited in “Morehouse and Hession, “Politics and Management:  The Problem of 
Limited Entry,” page 305. 
27 Originally Section 15 had read as follows:  “No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or 
authorized in the natural waters of the State.”  The amendment added the following sentence:  “This section does not 
restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent 
economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient 
development of aquaculture in the State.” 
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Figure 3 



















































The difficult task of balancing economic, social, political, legal and biological considerations in 
limiting entry then fell to the legislative and executive branches, in specifically prescribing the 
criteria for and implementing the new program.  To provide a factual basis for developing the 
program, the Governor appointed a Study Group on Limited Entry.  After six months of work, 
the Study Group released a 345-page report in February 1973, stating as its goal: 
 
The plan is intended to work fairly to leave in the fishery those people who 
depend most on fishing and have been at it the longest. The result will be a stable 
fishery that permits more effective sustained yield management and allows 
commercial fishermen the opportunity to make an adequate livelihood from 
fishing. 
 
The report recommended a full-time regulatory commission, with professional staff, to study 
each area, set maximum allowable gear levels, taking into consideration harvest history, income 
of fishermen, and sustained yield. It authorized the commission to set “standards of preference” 
and “priority classifications” in order to determine who would qualify for limited entry permits, 
and generally described the procedures to be used.   
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The legislature subsequently adopted statutes based on the Study Group’s recommendations that 
session.28  The law was challenged and successfully defended in the years that followed. The 
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission was established, appointed, and equipped to take on 
the difficult job of implementation. 
 
Thirty years have passed. There is little doubt that the adoption of limited entry allowed many 
fishermen, their families, and communities to be better off economically than they would have 
been had the large numbers of fishermen continued without limitation, at marginal levels of 
sustainability.  However, with the wisdom of hindsight, we can also see that limited entry did not 
stop the growth in fishing capacity.  Over time, fishermen who received limited entry permits 
invested more capital in boats and equipment, which led to increased fishing pressure on the 
stocks, and in turn to additional “conservation” regulations to restrict harvests and efficiency.   
Also, as discussed earlier, the provisions of the limited entry act that provided for determination 
and achievement of “optimum numbers” of permits were not implemented.  Limited entry, as 
implemented, did not provide a mechanism for adaptation of effort in the salmon industry to 
changing economic conditions during the 1990s. 
 
Our point, however, is not to debate the merits of the limited entry law, but rather to point out 
three critical elements of the process by which limited entry was proposed, debated, and adopted.  
First, the governor and the legislature were directly involved as leaders of this process.  They 
recognized that the industry faced an economic crisis and took responsibility for addressing it.  
Second, in proposing limited entry, the governor and the legislature were willing to think broadly 
and to consider far-reaching changes in fisheries management—to the extent of amending the 
Alaska constitution to allow these changes to take place.  Third, the governor and the legislature 
recognized the complexity of the issues and the need for expert research and analysis.  They 
created a Study Group on Limited Entry that addressed key technical issues related to limited 
entry. 
 
It is likely that these same three elements will be needed for successful restructuring to address 
the current economic crisis in the salmon industry:  leadership from the governor and the 
legislature, a willingness to think broadly, and expert research and analysis. 
 
As discussed above, it may be more difficult for the legislature to provide leadership for 
addressing salmon industry restructuring today than it was in the early 1970s.  At that time, many 
of the leaders in the legislature were fishermen, including the president of the Senate, Jay 
Hammond. They understood the issues from personal experience and were willing to take action 
because they understood the significance to their communities. Today a majority of legislators 
come from a few urban areas where few constituents identify commercial fishing issues as a 
primary concern.  This does not, however, make it any less essential for the legislature to take a 
leadership role if restructuring is to succeed. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Alaska Statutes, Chapter 16.43. 
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The Political Challenge of Limiting Entry 
 
Writing in 1972, Morehouse and Hession characterized the challenge of adopting limited entry as 
“essentially political”:  
 
The unlimited access of fishermen to resource stocks in commercial fisheries leads to excessive 
capacity, low average fishermen incomes and difficult and expensive regulation and 
enforcement…. The managers of Alaska’s salmon fisheries have traditionally defined their task 
as one of assuring the largest possible number of fish from season to season and their overriding 
concern has been with biological factors affecting that objective. 
 
The main types of regulation currently used to restrain efforts are those which impose limits on 
fishing time, area and gear. Regulations of this sort are referred to as “biological” or 
“conservation” modes, because their primary purpose is to prevent over fishing or to preserve 
the stocks…there are several problems associated with conservation modes of regulation. …they 
significantly reduce the efficiency of fishing operations—since they require more costly efforts 
on the part of a growing number of fishermen to catch a limited number of fish—and they are 
difficult and expensive to enforce… 
 
Why then, do fisheries managers in Alaska and elsewhere continue to depend on conservation 
modes of regulations to the exclusion of limitations on entry? The reasons are essentially 
political, and they can all be reduced to the issues of who is to be excluded, how are the 
increased benefits to be distributed, and with what justifications. 
 
Source:  Thomas A. Morehouse and Jack Hession , “Politics and Management: the Problem of 
Limited Entry,” in Arlon R. Tussing, Thomas A. Morehouse, and James D. Babb, Jr., eds.,  
Alaska Fisheries Policy (Fairbanks, Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research). 
pages 280 and 281. 
 
The Allocation to the Chignik Salmon Cooperative 
In January 2002, the Board of Fisheries passed regulations authorizing an allocation to a 
cooperative in the Chignik salmon fishery, which resulted in major restructuring of the fishery.  
Under the regulations, if 51 or more Chignik permit holders choose to join a cooperative, the 
cooperative receives an allocation of a percentage of the Chignik sockeye salmon harvest.  
Permit holders who choose not to join the cooperative may fish in a competitive fishery for that 
share of the harvest not allocated to the cooperative. 29    
 
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) manages the Chignik fishery with separate 
openings for the co-op and the competitive fishery.  The purpose of the regulations was to allow 
permit holders the opportunity to fish cooperatively to reduce costs, improve quality and increase 
value by reducing the number of vessels fishing and slowing down the fishery.  
 
 
                                                 
29Current regulations relating to the Chignik Co-op may be found in 5 AAC 15.359. 
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In 2002, the Chignik Seafood Producers Alliance (CSPA) formed as a cooperative in accordance 
with the new regulations.  In 2002 and 2003, 77 permit holders (out of a total of 100 permit 
holders in 2002 and 101 in 2003) joined the co-op, which was allocated 69.3% of the total 
harvest.  In 2004, 87 permit holders joined the co-op, which was allocated 87% of the total 
harvest. 
 
Our purpose here is not to argue that the Chignik co-op has or hasn’t been successful, or to 
advocate for or against potential similar co-ops in other salmon fisheries.  Instead our purpose is 
to discuss the process by which the Chignik co-op was established, and whether this process can 
serve as a useful model for restructuring of other Alaska salmon fisheries. 
 
Chignik permit holders had discussed the concept of a co-op for many years prior to 2002.  
Partly because of their experience with temporary co-ops—which fished during strikes—most 
recognized that substantial savings would be possible by fishing with fewer boats.  However, 
partly because of the wide variation in catches among permit holders, it was not possible to 
devise a way of sharing costs and profits that would satisfy everyone.  In addition, some permit 
holders were philosophically opposed to a co-op, or simply wanted to keep the fishery as it was. 
 
Thus the proposal considered by the Board of Fisheries in January 2002 was supported by a 
majority of permit holders, but strongly opposed by a vocal minority.  Supporters argued that the 
proposal was a reasonable and fair compromise among alternative proposals with respect to the 
size of the allocation and the sharing of profits among co-op members; that the proposal was 
essential for the economic survival of the fishery; and that the board had authority to make an 
allocation for the purpose of enhancing the economic viability of the fishery.  Opponents argued 
that the proposal was unfair, not necessary, and beyond the authority of the board.   
 
For months prior to the board meeting, as well as during the board meeting, co-op proponents 
engaged in discussions about the proposal with other Chignik permit holders as well as with 
board members, fishery managers, legislators, and others whom they thought could help 
persuade the board to support the proposal.  These efforts reflected sophisticated understanding 
of the board process and a great deal of time and effort.  Ultimately, they succeeded.  The board 
was persuaded by arguments that it would be acting within its authority, that the co-op would 
result in significant economic benefits, and that “Rome is burning”30 and action was needed to 
address an economic crisis.  The board unanimously voted to authorize an allocation to the co-
op, after modifying the formula for calculating the size of the allocation to the co-op. 
 
In considering the co-op, the board faced uncertainty about the extent of its authority to authorize 
an allocation to a co-op, or how that authority might be affected by the nature of the allocation.  
A legal opinion provided by the Alaska Department of Law concluded: 
 
While there are no court cases specifically on point that guarantee how a court 
would rule on a challenge to a regulation based on Proposal 105, we believe there 
are enough legal issues surrounding this proposal to warrant very careful 
consideration of whether it would be appropriate for the Board to proceed under 
its current statutory authorities.  If the Board decides it wants to adopt Proposal 
                                                 
30 This expression was used by Board of Fisheries member Dan Coffey in deliberations over the proposal. 
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105 or a similar proposal, we recommend that the Board seek additional statutory 
authority from the legislature to strengthen the Board’s ability to guarantee the 
equality of opportunity.  One option might be for the Board to take preliminary 
action contingent upon the legislature’s action to strengthen and expand Board 
authority.”31 
 
After the board approved the allocation, two Chignik permit holders sued to stop the allocation.  
In October 2002, an Alaska Superior Court ruled that the board did have authority to allocate to a 
co-op.  The case is currently under appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court 
upholds the decision of the Superior Court, it will have the effect of extending the extent to 
which the board has clear authority to restructure fisheries for economic purposes.   
 
The board also faced uncertainty about how the proposed allocation might affect catches of 
permit holders who did not join the co-op, how crew might be affected, how processors and 
tender operators might be affected, how different Chignik-area communities might be affected, 
how other Alaska salmon fisheries might be affected, and other potential economic and social 
effects of the co-op.  It acted with little or no independent analysis of what the specific economic 
or social effects of the co-op might be.32 
 
Since its implementation, the co-op has been extremely controversial among Chignik permit 
holders and Chignik area residents.  While a majority of permit holders have generally supported 
and praised the co-op in testimony to the Board of Fisheries and in a University of Alaska 
survey,33 some have bitterly opposed it.  Different permit holders offer widely varying 
perspectives on the effects of the co-op and whether it has been good or bad for permit holders 
and Chignik-area communities. The issues associated with the co-op have deeply divided some 
communities. 
 
What lessons may be drawn from the process by which the Chignik co-op was established?  One 
lesson is that it was possible for permit holders in an important Alaska salmon fishery to achieve 
significant restructuring by proposing changes to the Board of Fisheries.  This suggests that a 
carefully developed proposal for change, supported by a majority of permit holders, can be 
successfully achieved with extensive and effective lobbying of board members and others able to 
influence the board’s decisions. 
 
                                                 
31 Memorandum to Ed Dersham (Chair, Board of Fisheries) and Doug Mecum (Director, Division of Commercial 
Fisheries) from Lance B. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General, Alaska Department of Law, Natural Resources 
Section, January 3, 2002. 
32 One of the authors of this paper, Gunnar Knapp, testified to the Board of Fisheries in favor of “the basic concept” 
of the proposal, stating that “I support the Chignik proposal concept because it makes basic economic sense.  It 
makes sense to cut costs and improve quality.”  He did not analyze any of the specific issues, except to suggest that 
they were important, but should not become an excuse for inaction: “When you change fisheries management, the 
devil is in the details.  Who gets what allocation matters.  Effects on other fisheries matter.  Effects on processors 
matter.  We have to talk about these issues.  But we can resolve them.  We should not let them become an excuse for 
doing nothing.” 
33 Gunnar Knapp et al, Effects of the 2002 Chignik Cooperative:  A Survey of Chignik Salmon Permit Holders 
(2002). 
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However, the “Chignik co-op process” for achieving restructuring may be significantly more 
difficult for other Alaska fisheries than it was for Chignik.  Chignik is a unique fishery in several 
ways, including the concentration of the fishery in Chignik Lagoon on the sockeye salmon runs 
to a single river.  The Chignik co-op offered a clear opportunity for significant cost savings and 
quality improvement, while continuing to achieve conservation objectives and providing an 
alternative for those who wished to continue to fish in a (somewhat) traditional way.  In larger 
and more complex Alaska salmon fisheries, it may be much more difficult to devise approaches 
to restructuring that meet these three conditions. 
 
Because there are a relatively small number of Chignik permit holders, many of whom are local 
residents or have long-standing personal ties to the Chignik area, it was possible for co-op 
proponents to engage other permit holders in extensive discussions and thereby enlist significant 
support for the proposal.  In other fisheries with larger numbers of permit holders, or for which a 
larger share of permit holders are non-local residents, it may be much harder to bring a proposal 
to the board with the advance endorsement of a majority of permit holders.34    
 
In approving an allocation to the Chignik co-op, the board acted with significant uncertainty 
about potential economic and social effects of the co-op.  It had no specific standards against 
which to judge a proposal for restructuring the fishery, nor any independent analysis to help it 
understand how the proposal might meet such standards.  For example, the formula for the 
allocation to the co-op was a critical part of the board’s action, with significant implications for 
how different permit holders might be affected by the co-op.  In devising this formula, the board 
relied primarily on the judgment of its members and the arguments of co-op supporters and 
opponents as to what objectives it was trying to achieve through this allocation and whether the 
formula would achieve these objectives.  
 
This is perhaps the greatest concern in using the “Chignik co-op process” for restructuring other 
salmon fisheries.  With larger and more complex fisheries, there is greater potential for 
overworked and under-supported board members to approve significant management changes 
with unforeseen and unintended consequences. 
 
Prior to and since the board’s January 2002 allocation to the Chignik co-op, no other major 
restructuring proposal has been adopted or seriously discussed by the board for any other Alaska 
salmon fishery, despite a long and continuing economic decline in the Alaska salmon industry.  
This, perhaps more than any other argument, suggests that the Chignik co-op represents an 
exception, rather than a model for how restructuring of other Alaska fisheries may be 
undertaken.  Without clearer responsibility, clearer authority, and clearer definition of the 
relationship of economic objectives to other fisheries management objectives, and additional 
resources, it is unlikely that the Board of Fisheries can take the lead in initiating or facilitating 
restructuring of Alaska salmon fisheries. 
                                                 
34 In addition, most Chignik permits continued to be fished at the time the co-op was proposed.  It may be much 
more difficult to enlist support for restructuring from active permit holders in other fisheries in which significant 
numbers of permits are no longer fished, and in which the benefits of restructuring might have to be shared with 
larger numbers of “latent” or inactive permit holders. 
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Restructuring of Federally Managed Alaska Fisheries 
The federal government manages fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska (beyond 
three miles offshore).  Over the past fifteen years, the federal government has undertaken major 
restructuring of several important Alaska fisheries, including implementation of individual 
fishing quotas in the halibut and sablefish fisheries,35 the allocation of Bering Sea pollock 
fisheries to cooperatives under the American Fisheries Act,36 and the recent adoption of a plan 
for individual fishing quotas (and processor quotas) for Bering Sea crab fisheries.37  A full 
review of these management changes is far beyond the scope of this paper.  Here we briefly 
suggest some lessons that the federal restructuring of these fisheries may hold for state 
restructuring of Alaska salmon fisheries. 
 
A first lesson is that restructuring can succeed in strengthening the economic viability of 
commercial fisheries.  Restructuring has lowered costs, increased value, and helped to develop 
new markets for Alaska’s halibut, sablefish, and pollock fisheries.  The profitability of these 
fisheries has increased—in dramatic contrast to recent trends in Alaska’s salmon fisheries. 
 
A second lesson is that restructuring is inherently controversial.  The restructuring of federal 
fisheries was highly contentious.  Controversy continues over the economic and social impacts of 
the changes in these fisheries on fishermen, processors, and communities.  This suggests that it is 
unlikely that restructuring of salmon fisheries can occur without controversy and without making 
some people unhappy.  Restructuring will inevitably involve difficult choices. 
 
A third lesson is that restructuring is possible when management agencies have clear 
responsibility, authority, and resources to consider economic viability in managing fisheries.  
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council is charged with establishing management policy 
for federal fisheries off Alaska.  Unlike the Alaska Board of Fisheries, the council has clear 
responsibility and authority to consider economic implications of fisheries management and to 
undertake major restructuring for primarily economic purposes.  It also has the resources to do 
so.  The council has a permanent staff of sixteen people, including an executive director, deputy 
director, three economists, three fisheries analysts and two plan coordinators.38  (In contrast, the 
Board of Fisheries has an executive director, no research staff, and no research budget.)  The 
council also has an industry advisory panel (AP) and a scientific and statistical committee (SSC) 
of experts—including economists--which meet concurrently and advise the council.   
 
The council has both the capacity to develop and analyze restructuring proposals independently 
and to examine not only biological impacts on the ecosystem but economic effects on fishery 
participants and communities. The council decides whether to consider a general area of policy 
and directs staff to do the necessary analyses. It relies on both its science advisors and its 
                                                 
35 For a review of the development of the halibut and sablefish IFQ program, see Clarence G. Pautzke and Chris W. 
Oliver, Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program for Sablefish and Halibut Longline Fisheries off 
Alaska (1997).   
36For a detailed discussion of the American Fisheries Act, see North Pacific Fisheries Management Council, Impacts 
of the American Fisheries Act, Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Commerce (2002). 
37 For a detailed discussion of restructuring of Bering Sea crab fisheries, see National Marine Fisheries Service, 
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fisheries (2004).   
38 Information posted on the Web site of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, October 2004, at 
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc. 
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stakeholder panel, in addition to its professional staff, for advice and suggestions. It then 
schedules the policy initiative for formal hearings.  It decisions are implemented unless 
disapproved by the Secretary of Commerce or Congress, which occurs only rarely. 
 
In making its decisions, the council can look to the national standards of the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act for authority and guidance.  As indicated by the 
underlined portions of the standards listed below, these include a number of direct and indirect 
economic and social considerations that must be balanced with other management objectives.   
 
Selected National Standards of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
 
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the 
optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry. 
 
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of different States. If it 
becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation 
shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and (C) 
carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of 
such privileges.  
 
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery 
resources; except that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.  
 
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary 
duplication.  
 
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements of this Act 
(including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account the importance of 
fishery resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, 
and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities. 
 
 (10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote the safety of human life at 
sea. 
 
Source:  Public Law 94-265, as amended through October 11, 1996.  Posted at www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/magact. 
 
When the council has been unable to reach agreement on controversial restructuring issues, the 
U.S. Congress has played an active role in bringing about change, as occurred with the direct 
involvement of Senator Ted Stevens in the development of the American Fisheries Act.  
Congress may also block the council from some actions, as occurred with the congressionally 
imposed moratorium on new IFQ programs in the late 1990s.  For better or worse, in contrast to 
the reluctance of the Alaska legislature to become involved in restructuring state-managed 
salmon fisheries, the U.S. Congress has played an active role in restructuring federal fisheries off 
Alaska, largely because of the influence and interest of powerful legislators, including Senator 
Stevens.   
 
We are not suggesting that the federal fisheries management process is an ideal model for the 
state to follow.  It can be cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive.  Much of the analysis 
that it undertakes may be driven more by process than substance.   It may not always be fair.  It 
may be dominated at times by the interests of particular groups or individuals.  It is subject to 
intervention by Congress.  But the federal fishery management process has been able to bring 
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about change in response to changing economic circumstances—which has been difficult for the 
state.  
 
If the state’s fishery management process is at one extreme in its capacity for addressing 
restructuring—with insufficient involvement by the legislature, unclear delegation of 
responsibility and authority for restructuring to fishery management agencies, lack of standards 
to guide restructuring, and minimal capacity for independent analysis—the federal fishery 
management process may be at the other extreme.  But the state should consider what features of 
the federal fishery management process—if any—might strengthen the state process in its ability 
to address restructuring. 
 
Conclusions:  Suggestions for the Salmon Restructuring Panel 
The Board of Fisheries’ Salmon Industry Restructuring Panel offers a new opportunity to address 
the complex issues associated with restructuring the salmon industry. In concluding this paper, 
we offer four suggestions we believe can help the panel make substantive progress in addressing 
these issues.  Our suggestions are based on our analysis of the inherent challenges in 
restructuring Alaska salmon management (diversity of the fisheries, complexity of the issues, 
constitutional uncertainties, and controversy), the institutional constraints to restructuring, and 
previous experiences in restructuring Alaska fisheries.    
 
First, the panel members should focus their efforts on issues associated with restructuring, and 
avoid the temptation to discuss other approaches for enhancing the economic viability of 
Alaska’s salmon industry, such as marketing, product diversification and infrastructure support.  
While these approaches are important, they have been and continue to be discussed extensively 
in other forums. In contrast, restructuring has been ignored or avoided. It is by focusing 
specifically on restructuring that the panel can best serve the board and the legislature.  
 
Second, the panel should initiate careful analysis of a number of legal, economic, and social 
issues. These include the complex legal questions associated with restructuring and how legal 
uncertainties might be resolved by legislation; the cumulative economic and social effects of 
salmon management regulations that have been adopted over time; the potential economic and 
social effects on fishermen and communities of different approaches to restructuring; and how 
adverse effects might be mitigated.  Collectively, this analysis will represent a major 
undertaking, requiring significant time and money.  However, it is essential for addressing the 
uncertainty and confusion that has hampered substantive discussion of restructuring. 
 
Third, the panel should not try to define specific restructuring solutions for Alaska’s many 
different salmon fisheries.  Rather, it should devise a process by which the stakeholders in 
different fisheries can initiate and achieve change, within a broad framework of management 
options.  It should identify biological, economic, social, and legal standards by which proposals 
will be evaluated, and how and by whom decisions will be made.   
 
Stated more generally, the panel should recommend a solution to the fundamental institutional 
problem of the absence of clear responsibility, authority, and capability to make changes in 
fisheries management necessary for the economic success of Alaska’s fisheries.  It should 
suggest how this responsibility, authority and capability can be clearly established.  Ultimately, 
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this will require action by the legislature.  The most difficult but most important contribution of 
the panel can be in suggesting how to address this fundamental problem which has kept Alaska 
from responding effectively to a worsening economic crisis in the salmon industry. 
 
Last but not least, the panel should assist the board and the legislature in a meaningful discussion 
of Alaska’s goals for its salmon fishery. Ideally, this discussion would lead to a clearer definition 
of the constitutionally mandated objective of managing Alaska’s salmon resources for the 
“maximum benefit” of Alaskans. Clearer policy guidance from the legislature on the relationship 
between biological, social and economic objectives would help all the organizations that have 
some responsibility for management. This could perhaps take the form of state salmon 
management standards, with a similar role to that of the national standards of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act for federal fisheries management. 
 
Ultimately, the legislature must follow through on the work of the panel.  Without a commitment 
by the legislature to take action, real progress cannot be accomplished. Alaska cannot afford to 
avoid decisions about how to make our salmon fisheries more competitive internationally.  As 
painful as the choices may be, the alternative is more painful. As time passes with no action, the 
conditions that are hurting the industry will continue to stress the industry’s viability and the 
capacity of participants to continue in the fishery. Alaska should take action to avoid more 
bankruptcies, more lost boats and permits, and more people leaving coastal communities that 
rely on fishing. 
 
The authority to manage our salmon fisheries was one of the prizes of statehood.  Our federally 
managed fisheries—specifically halibut and pollock—have succeeded in difficult and 
fundamental restructuring efforts that have made them not only biological but also economic 
successes. It will be a sad irony if Alaska—having won the right to manage our salmon 
fisheries—cannot find a way to enable them to succeed economically. 
 
The future of Alaska’s salmon industry may depend on the work of this panel, and on how the 
Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Legislature respond to its recommendations. All Alaskans 
should take an interest in and support this process. 
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